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1. Introduction 
 
Neglected diseases (NDs) are so called because pharmaceutical firms cannot make an 
adequate return on research and development (R&D) into their prevention and cure. With 
the exception of tuberculosis, these diseases mainly occur in low income countries where 
patients have low purchasing power and which lack functioning healthcare systems. 
Approximately 2.5 million people die every year from NDs. Because NDs are parasitic 
and bacterial infections, they potentially put the majority of the human race at risk. 
Tuberculosis, malaria, schistosomiasis, leishmaniasis and others as listed in Table 
1 affect more than 1 billion people and yet less than 0.001% of the US$ 60–70 billion 
spent on new drug development is dedicated to ND treatments (WHO, 2009: 3). Few of 
the new chemical entities are drugs for tropical diseases (Pecoul, Chirac et al. 1999; 
Trouiller, Olliaro et al., 2002). Chirac and Torreele (2006) shows that out of 163 new 
chemical entities marketed between 2000 and 2004, four drugs (2.5%) were for NDs. 
Since then some progress has been noticed for tuberculosis, malaria and dengue, but 
other diseases have no new drug candidate registered in the US (Wolters Kluwer Health's 
Adis R&D Insight)
1. Progress on tuberculosis, malaria and dengue may be explained by 
increased R&D spending (Moran, Guzman et al., 2008: 5).  
Academic research is sparse: less than 2% of all citations on PubMed, the U.S. 
national digital archive of biomedical and life sciences journal literature, were attributed 
to tropical diseases for the period 1980-1999 (Lanjouw and Cockburn, 2001). And even 
when some progress is made with the development of drugs which could cure NDs, 
                                                 
1 available at http://newmeds.phrma.org, accessed on 1 July 2010.   4
pharmaceutical companies are cautious in publishing the results for fear of increased 
public pressure (Moran, Ropars et al., 2005). 
The burden of these diseases is heavy if measured by the disability-adjusted life 
year (DALY). DALY measures the time lost in being ill; it combines years of life lost 
due to premature mortality and years of life lost due to time spent being ill. One year of 
less than healthy live is equal to one DALY. Japanese having the longest life expectancy, 
premature mortality is measured against Japanese life expectancy. Various schemes have 
been put forward in an attempt to alleviate this burden by increasing pharmaceutical 
R&D related to NDs. This paper aims to describe these proposals and to assess their 
efficiency.  
The next section reviews the burden of these diseases and ways in which that 
burden is exacerbated by conditions in low income countries; section III discusses 
disadvantages of the existing proposals to tackle the NDs problem; section IV compares 
existing proposals through a policy analysis framework followed by our 
recommendations and a conclusion. 
 
2. Burden of neglected diseases 
 
Some NDs, such as tuberculosis and malaria, have many sufferers and create a large 
health burden (table 1). Comparing the global burden of neglected diseases in 2004 with 
2001, tuberculosis, malaria, and Chagas disease show modest progress (column 4) while 
mixed or no progress is observed for most of the other NDs during that period.  
   5
Table 1 - Major neglected diseases and their characteristics ranked by global burden   6
Disease Disease Disease Disease       
       
       
(1) (1) (1) (1)       
People at r People at r People at r People at risk in a  isk in a  isk in a  isk in a 
year year year year       
       
(2) (2) (2) (2)       
Regional  Regional  Regional  Regional 
concentration concentration concentration concentration       
       
(3) (3) (3) (3)       
DALYs,  DALYs,  DALYs,  DALYs, 
thousand thousand thousand thousand       
2004/2001  2004/2001  2004/2001  2004/2001        
(4) (4) (4) (4)       
Deaths,  Deaths,  Deaths,  Deaths, 
thousand  thousand  thousand  thousand 
2004/2001 2004/2001 2004/2001 2004/2001       
(5) (5) (5) (5)       
Major health  Major health  Major health  Major health 
damage damage damage damage       
       
(6) (6) (6) (6)       
Available  Available  Available  Available 
medicine medicine medicine medicine       
       




Over 2bn carry the 
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after HIV  
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Africa, SE Asia, 
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Might lead to 
permanent 
damage for skin, 
nerves, and eyes 
Fully cured in 
most countries, 
effective drugs 
exist   7
caused by bacillus  
Sources: Ford (2006: 112); http://www.who.int/tdr/svc/diseases (the WHO Program for Research and Training in 
Tropical Diseases); http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/, 
http://www.wpro.who.int/health_topics/schistosomiasis/; Deworming for health and development. Report of the third 
global meeting of the partners for parasite control, Geneva: World Health Organization, 2005. Data on tuberculosis is 
obtained from http://www.tballiance.org/why/tb-threat.php; columns (2), (6) and (7) are based on Hotez, Molyneux et al. 
(2007); column (7) is supplemented by data from Mrazek and Mossialos (2003). Columns (4) and (5) for 2004 are based 
on WHO (2008: 54-56); the data for 2001: Lopez, A. D. and Disease Control Priorities Project (2006: 174, 228, 452). 
 
Using WHO (2008) data we estimated the median of DALYs lost to NDs was 13.1% in 
countries with GDP per capita below $1000 by purchasing power parity (PPP) in 
international dollars. Decreased workers’ productivity due to neglected tropical diseases 
(excluding tuberculosis) causes losses of potential output worth billions dollars (Hotez, 
Molyneux et al., 2007: 1021). An economic cost of DALYs for malaria alone could be 
valued at 5.8 percent of the gross national product of sub-Saharan Africa if each DALY is 
valued conservatively as equal to per capita income (Report of the Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health, 2001: 31). Using the same conservative evaluation and the 
WHO (2008) data for year 2004, we estimated the median share of GDP lost to neglected 
diseases was 7.25% for countries with GDP per capita less than $1000 by PPP.  
 
Testing for causes 
 
NDs might be labelled as diseases of poverty implying that rising income would 
eliminate most of the disease burden. However this is not the whole story. Poverty, lack 
of sanitation, lack of political commitment are all reasons that have been advocated in the 
literature to explain the burden of NDs (WHO, 2009:11). Preston (1975) finds a high 
positive correlation between the logarithm of national per capita income and life 
expectancy for low income countries. Research by Pritchett and Summers (1996) 
supports the hypothesis that economic growth reduces infant mortality. The causal   8
relation between health and poverty can run in both directions. Poverty significantly 
reduces access to proper nutrition and health care products and services, and, in turn, 
health problems can reduce productivity and corresponding labour compensations. 
Lorentzen, McMillan et al (2008) find that a greater risk of death discourages education, 
savings and investment and this largely explains poor growth performance of most 
African countries.  
In most of the countries concerned, political commitment prioritizing healthcare is 
lacking as can be seen by the lack of access to basic infrastructure, taxes and non-tariff 
barriers for imported medicines, difficulties in contract enforcement, and bureaucratised 
patenting (Ahmed, Cudjoe et al., 2007). While some diseases could be treated easily and 
cheaply such as intestinal worms (treatments cost less than a dollar per year and only 
need to be taken once or twice per year with no side effect) little is done – despite one in 
four people being affected worldwide (Kremer, 2002: 68). The lack of governance in the 
health sector as reflected by absenteeism and corruption of health personnel and health care 
managers has been evidenced as being crucial (Lewis, 2006). Suspicion of corruption in 
Zambia (Mfula, 2010) translated in $33 million of health assistance being suspended in 
2009 by Sweden and the Netherlands and another $300 million in 2010 by The Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.  
According to the political economy literature (McCarty and Meirowitz, 2007), the 
lack of political commitment is explained by the relatively short political horizons of 
elected officials in comparison to long drug development cycles; by the diversion of 
funds to some “national pride” big investment projects; by a lack of qualified cost-benefit 
estimations of the impact of the disease burden on the economy that would enhance   9
political visibility of such diseases; and lastly because the people affected by these 
diseases have little political voice. 
 
The data and estimation 
We tested the hypothesis that sanitation, government commitments to health care and per 
capita income have a negative association with the burden of NDs. We use data for the 
year 2004 for which the recent disease burden estimations of the WHO (2008) are 
available. Unfortunately, methodological inconsistency in DALY estimates across time 
and countries provided by the WHO disables panel data analysis. The WHO report on 
global burden of diseases gives the most recent comparable cross-country estimates of 
DALYs (WHO, 2008). Other variables have been obtained from the World Bank web site 
of the World Development Indicators and The Worldwide Governance Indicators
2 for 
188 countries (table 2). Commitment to health care is proxied by the share of public 
health expenditures in total government expenditures and by governance indicators. 
 
Table 2 - Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Lnurses  60  .2035  1.1211  -1.6607  2.6532 
Lhlgov  187  2.2458  .5574  -.3567  3.5086 
Lgdp  176  8.5512  1.2922  5.5281  11.1186 
Lsanita  159  3.8141  .7722  1.0986  4.6052 
Lwater  168  4.2428  .3939  2.3979  4.6052 
Lrural  185  3.6403  .7339  .5423  4.5029 
Ldalyn  188  5.6861  2.3121  .4947  9.2395 
The governance indicators of the World Bank: 
Va  188  -.06  1.02  -2.14  1.83 
Gaf  188  -.06  1.00  -2.16  2.34 
Cc  185  -.08  1.00  -1.79  2.43 
 
                                                 
2 available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp   10
With ldalyn, lnurses, lhlgov, lgdp, lsanita, lwater, lrural respectively logarithms of 
DALYs lost to neglected diseases, nurses per 1,000 people, public health expenditure in 
total government expenditures, GDP per capita by PPP, improved sanitation facilities, 
improved water source, and share of rural population; va, gaf and cc stand respectively 
for the governance indicators: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and 
control of corruption. 
There is a negative correlation between the logarithms of DALYs lost to NDs and 
access to water, numbers of nurses, and government efficiency (table 3). 
 
Table 3 - Correlation between major regressors  
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1. ldalyn  1.00                   
2. lnurses  -0.67  1.00                 
3. lhlgov  -0.15  0.29  1.00               
4. lgdp  -0.67  0.79   0.25  1.00             
5. lsanita  -0.53  0.53  0.11  0.49  1.00           
6. lwater  -0.60  0.45  0.12  0.40  0.40  1.00         
7. lrural  0.45  -0.45  -0.25  0.55  -0.29  -0.20  1.00       
8. va  -0.47  0.51  0.45  0.47  0.30  0.38  -0.35  1.00     
9. gaf  -0.73  0.62  0.40  0.67  0.38  0.51  -0.48  0.77  1.00   
10. cc  -0.76  0.61  0.39  0.61  0.31  0.52  -0.50  0.77  0.93  1.00 
 
We run the following simple cross section OLS (table 4) to see if sanitation and national 
income corresponds with the burden of diseases for NDs: 
Ldalyni = α1 + α2lgdpi + α3lsanitai  + α4lwateri + α5lrurali + α6lhlgovi + α7lnursesi + α8 Governance 
indicatori+ εi 
 
where the residuals follow a white noise process for a country i. 
Table 4 - Regression results for logarithm of DALYs lost NDs per 100,000 
population, 2004 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 












Lsanita   -.459    -.458     -.271  -.506  -.356  -.453     11
(.166)***  (.168)***  (.183)  (.160)***  (.142)**  (.182)** 


































Lnurses      -.293 
(.199) 
     
Gaf      -.944   
(.276)*** 
     





Va            -.493 
(.175) 






 16.771   
(1.971)*** 




Observations  148  148  54  147  97  148 
F-statistic  76.84  62.77  16.21  111.45  32.34  65.66 
R^2  0.742  0.742  0.718  0.796  0.663  0.764 
Note: heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** - at the 1%,  
** - at 5%, * - at 10%. The fifth regression estimates coefficients for low and lower-middle-income 
economies in the classification of the World Bank World Development Report (2005).  
 
GDP per capita, improved access to sanitation, and water appear to be statistically 
significant across most specifications. Share of rural population or government 
expenditures on health are not robustly significant indicators for the burden of NDs. 
Using regression specification 4, elasticity of DALYs lost to NDs by sanitation facilities 
is -0.51, by access to water is -1.01, and a one unit improvement in the control of 
corruption index reduces the DALYs lost by 0.83%. A similar estimation for the low and 
lower-middle-income countries listed in the World Development Report (World Bank, 
2005: 291) gives elasticity of DALYs lost to NDs by GDP per capita at -0.9, by sanitation 
facilities at -0.36, by access to water at -0.69, and one unit increase in the control of 
corruption decreases the DALYs by 0.45%. Improved access to water and control of 
corruption appear to have strong impact on the burden of NDs. It follows that more 
committed national policies in these areas could make a difference.    12
However, if that is a necessary condition for progress, it is not a sufficient one. 
Governments of low income countries still need efficient drugs to be available, and such 
countries lack the capacity to conduct modern pharmaceutical R&D, especially for pre-
clinical research, which often requires sophisticated technologies and research skills.  
Various reasons have been advanced in the literature explaining why the 
pharmaceutical industry has not been forthcoming in developing NDs drugs: the small 
size of the markets for pharmaceuticals; a significant mismatch of medical conditions 
between people in rich and affected countries, especially in infectious and parasitic 
diseases; the scarcity of qualified medics; the corruption of drug procurement and misuse 
of drugs leading to the building of drug resistance; the pharmaceutical regulation 
sometimes driven by political agenda rather than efficiency considerations; the limited 
intellectual property rights for pharmaceutical (Kremer, 2002); failures of social 
insurance markets in poor countries Farlow (2005); Berndt and Hurvitz (2005) also 
emphasize a free rider problem where countries expect other countries to take on the risks 
and costs of a breakthrough in R&D for the commonly experienced diseases; and once 
R&D costs are sunk, monopsonic powers are used by governments to set lower prices for 
drugs, which discourage pharmaceutical R&D from the outset. Therefore a typical 
prisoners’ dilemma sets in where neither the pharmaceutical corporations nor the 
governments of the affected countries rush to develop new drugs. 
 
3. A survey of the various schemes to stimulate R&D 
   13
Proposals can be broadly divided into three types of incentives – push, pull and mixed. 
Push incentives involve companies being paid in advance of drug discoveries, creating a 
supply-side incentive for R&D; pull incentives are the offer of various rewards for 
successful drug discoveries (such as prizes or patent buy-outs) in effect guaranteeing 
demand for the final product hence a positive return on the R&D investment. All these 
schemes face the problem of sustainable funding. The difficulty is to reduce barriers to a 
successful innovation process comprising risk management, integration of knowledge, 
and learning from past R&D project failures (Pisano, 2006).  
 
3.1 Push schemes 
Push schemes include R&D tax incentives, grants, direct public funding or services for 
pharmaceutical companies, non-profit public-private partnership, open-source R&D. All 
these schemes however have their limitations. 
Most of the various R&D subsidy schemes suffer a moral hazard problem 
(Attaran and Granville, 2004: 187). R&D tax credits involve complicated administration, 
may stimulate creative accounting, and might be useless for biotechnology firms which 
while conducting innovative research often have no taxable accounting profit (Kremer 
and Glennerster, 2004: 53). Direct public involvement in the form of grants runs the risk 
of being exposed to moral hazard and adverse selection problems as donors cannot 
comprehensively monitor researchers and evaluate costs and the probability of success 
for mooted research projects. For example, Children’s Vaccine Initiative founded in 
1990/1991 closed down in 1999 without significant success; this ending did not come as 
a surprise given the bureaucracy and politicised conflicts engendered by the large number   14
of sponsors (Murashkin, 1996). Other examples include $60 million spent by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) on malaria vaccine with little 
result except for some researchers being found guilty in the 1980s of having diverted 
grant funds (Kremer, 2002: 83). Aid inefficiency should not be attributed to the USAID 
as illustrated by Easterly and Pfutze (2008) who ranked 37 aid agencies by their 
transparency, selectivity, fragmentation of aid, overhead costs, and use of effective 
channels. USAID was ranked sixteenth while most UN Agencies were placed at the 
bottom of the rankings. This ranking exercise casts doubt on the idea of creating a global 
public organization – as has been proposed by the Commission on Macroeconomics and 
Health which supports the establishment of a new Global Health Research Fund (GHRF), 
with sufficient funding to disburse around $1.5 billion per year (Report of the 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001: 14). Such an organization might 
merely add to the list of inefficient aid agencies. The low efficiency of bureaucrats in 
business and in correctly picking winners is well documented and raises doubt as their 
capacity to nurture efficient innovations (World Bank, 1995).  
Of all the push incentives scheme public-private partnerships (PPPs) seems to be 
a better choice in terms of generating R&D as PPPs are seen as organizationally flexible 
and more cost efficient than government organizations (Light, 2009; Moran, Ropars et 
al., 2005; Munos, 2006). PPPs are non-for-profit project-based organizations which 
reduce the risks and costs of R&D by involving governments, private subcontractors like 
pharmaceutical firms or clinical research organizations (CRO) and philanthropic 
organizations. Philanthropic organizations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, Médecins Sans Frontières, and the Rockefeller Foundation provided the bulk   15
of the funding for the period 2000-2004 with 79% of all funds compared to 16% by 
OECD governments and 3% by UN organizations excluding the WHO (Moran, Ropars et 
al., 2005: 34). The successful PPPs are characterized by effective governance, competent 
management and staff, and proper scientific external review (Mahoney, Krattiger et al., 
2007: 4009). About half of drugs developed by PPPs are highly innovative and developed 
faster than the industry on its own. PPPs require less outside funding, entail lower risk 
and direct operational involvement of an outside donor, and can be adapted to the needs 
of specific developing countries. Most PPPs with small company partnerships cover 
direct costs of R&D and exclude interest payments and overheads. The PPPs which 
operate with large pharmaceutical companies often required the least outside funding 
(Moran, Ropars et al., 2005).   
PPPs are not perfect, however. Faster drug development time may be explained 
not by superior organisation but simply because PPPs usually work with drug candidates 
at advanced phases of development and only for diseases with a large potential 
commercial patient base such as tuberculosis and malaria (Trouiller, Olliaro et al., 2002). 
When such base is lacking, PPPs may not be viable: Buruli ulcer, trachoma and 
rheumatic fever did not have any intermediaries or partnerships (Moran, Guzman et al. 
2008:43). Some drug candidates may be revived projects previously declined by private 
firms for commercial reasons. Once such drug candidates are exhausted, R&D costs for 
PPPs might substantially increase (Munos, 2006). Patents on new products might be 
appropriated by pharmaceutical firms resulting in high prices being charged for middle-
income countries and for poor people in high income countries (Sarewitz, Foladori et al., 
2004).    16
PPPs also suffer from asymmetric information. A donor knows less than an actual 
drug developer about the real state of progress and its potential risks and costs (Ridley, 
Grabowski et al., 2006). Maurer (2006) suspects that PPPs maybe more willing to tolerate 
inefficient drug projects and tend to allocate patents to participating companies. This 
might compromise affordability of the resultant new drugs through patent protection. 
PPPs’ staff often have no pharmaceutical industry experience and this can cause 
misunderstanding especially as regards the needs of small pharmaceutical companies 
(Moran, Ropars et al., 2005: 27); PPPs suffer from a lack of accountability, they often do 
not publish their budgets, outcomes, and governance structures and their priorities and 
selection criteria for research projects are not always clearly set; they tend to work in 
parallel rather than with proper collaboration resulting in fragmentation of efforts in 
relation to specific diseases though The Global Forum for Health research supports 
information exchange through networks (Mrazek and Mossialos, 2003); corporations 
participating in PPPs might be driven by marketing or public relations motivation without 
a hardened commitment to the real objective putting into question the financial 
sustainability of PPPs (Moran, Ropars et al, 2005). Moran, Ropars et al. (2005) also 
recognize that most PPPs experience funding shortfalls slowing down the R&D process. 
Moreover commercial firms might be tempted to channel public subsides or financing to 
other areas of their commercial research and can quite easily mislead their partners on the 
true costs of the research (Hollis, 2006: 128).  
Another push scheme is Open-source R&D where contributions are made 
voluntarily by representatives from academia, public institutions, and pharmaceutical 
firms. Maurer, Rai et al. (2004) propose donations by companies, universities, and   17
individuals with subsequent free access to software, research tools, drug candidates, and 
databases based on licences that permit anyone to use information. Munos (2006) 
advocates an open-source component for knowledge-based work combined with a 
managed project approach and outsourcing for rule-based work. The best ideas are then 
selected and transformed into projects to be financed and outsourced with an open call for 
sponsors. Remuneration is mainly non monetary such as enhanced reputation. For 
Munos, the majority of PPPs already operate in this way managing a portfolio of drug 
discovery projects while outsourcing R&D. The most vivid example of this is the 
Medicines for Malaria Venture as well as the Institute for One World Health. These 
bodies openly call for drug project ideas and based on the scrutiny and recommendations 
of an external scientific committee select the best ones to be funded, and then outsource 
the relevant R&D. The crucial elements are the presence of committed partners, strong 
project leadership, and experience in drug discovery projects. Potential problems with 
this scheme include guessing costs of private companies-subcontractors, lack of upstream 
research as drug candidates are borrowed from elsewhere, and under funding (Maurer, 
Rai et al., 2004). 
 
3.2 Pull schemes.  
 
Patents are the most conventional pull factor but are not applicable on their own to NDs 
given the lack of purchasing power. Various schemes have therefore been designed to 
motivate pharmaceuticals to trade patent protection of drugs against various rewards.    18
Pogge (2006) proposes to establish a reward for new drugs in proportion to that 
particular drugs’ contribution to the decrease in the global burden of disease. This scheme 
assumes a global public good strategy as a parallel alternative to the patent based 
approach to pharmaceutical innovation. In exchange for patents on life saving medicines 
put into public domain, firms will be rewarded from a global public fund in proportion to 
the realized impact on global health for the duration of what would have been the patent 
life. The idea is that firms would be stimulated to produce and sell cheap essential drugs 
widely to enhance the global health impact. Pogge assumes that this strategy will require 
US$45-90 billion of annual public contributions to the global fund. Hollis (2006, 2007) 
proposes an Optional Reward system, which foresees sponsors paying about $500 million 
for ND drugs annually based on estimations of the global therapeutic effectiveness of 
those drugs. A somewhat similar idea of an independent public non profit drug 
development corporation, which would largely finance drug R&D based on cost-
effectiveness analysis in the US is proposed by Finkelstein (2008). The problem with 
these proposals involving a huge global public policy strategy is that they run the risk of 
encountering the same deficiencies found in government programmes: corruption and 
lobbyism, methodological problems of estimating the global disease burden reduction, 
difficulties with collection and assessment of information across countries, establishment 
of proper international controls, deficiency of expertise etc. It is not clear who, why, and 
how much should be contributed to the global fund and how the necessary volume of the 
fund should be estimated or optimized in the event of a budget deficit. As Pogge’s 
strategy essentially amounts to the public in developed countries subsidising patients in 
low income countries, questions of political feasibility might legitimately be raised.   19
However, the idea of rewarding pharmaceutical innovators based on their realized 
contribution to the global health can set correct incentives for drug R&D.  
Other pull schemes include extending the duration of intellectual property rights 
or fast track approval in exchange for NDs drugs and guaranteed advance market 
commitments (AMCs). The extension of patent rights on (some) drugs in exchange for 
drugs for NDs has been proposed by Jean-Paul Garnier, CEO of Glaxo (Hollis, 2006: 
131). This scheme proposes large cross-subsidies indirectly paid by patients and health 
insurances from developed countries. Only a part of the lost consumer surplus due to 
higher drug prices is transferred into more R&D, including NDs, and increased 
companies’ profits. However if the current level of efficient patent life is sufficient to 
encourage innovations, such cross-subsidies are likely to create large distortions and 
dead-weight losses. Hollis (2007) criticizes patent extensions as higher patent-protected 
drug prices will be imposed on sick people without giving additional incentives to 
develop the best drugs.   
AMCs promise to buy a drug with some pre-specified standards, primarily 
vaccines, at a stipulated price and quantity (Kremer, M., O. Barder, et al, 2005). Although 
vaccines might be the most efficient medicine, saving millions every year – probably 4-5 
times more than an average drug, many pharmaceutical firms have scaled back or shut 
down their vaccine operations even in developed countries. In 1997, only two out of the 
twenty top pharmaceutical companies produced vaccines (Bartfai and Lees, 2006: 198, 
268). In the US the number of licensed vaccine manufacturers decreased from 26 in 1967 
to 12 in 2004 with four dominant players (Milstein, Batson et al. 2005: 1).   20
In “Making Markets for Vaccines: Ideas to Action”, a report produced by the 
Center for Global Development (CGD) Advance Market Commitment (AMC)
3 Working 
Group chaired by Michael Kremer, Ruth Levine, and Alice Albright (operational from 
2003 to April 2005), an AMC plan for vaccines was put forward. The plan include 
establishing an independent adjudication committee (IAC) with the support of donors and 
the industry to identify medical parameters of a vaccine with a right to lower those 
parameters if necessary; sponsors would legally bind themselves to purchase the 
specified vaccine at some commercially attractive minimum price to immunize a fixed 
number of persons. The price is set per treated person and developing countries would 
pay an affordable co-payment. The proposed minimum amount of purchase set at $3.1 
billion in net present value (in 2004 dollars) is estimated to represent adjusted revenue 
from a typically successful commercial new chemical entity drug; an inventor agreeing to 
this contract must also set a low price, close to the marginal cost, for additional units of 
the vaccine, or put a production license into a public domain. In order to match the supply 
of vaccines with demand from low income countries sponsors would subsidize purchases 
of the vaccine by qualifying countries up to the specified amount; the residual co-
payments will be matched by the governments of the disease affected countries to ensure 
the commitment of recipients (Kremer, Barder et al. 2005). The APC reward could be 
adjusted to take into account direct funding already received by the inventor from other 
sources, the progress already achieved in vaccine development before launching the APC 
and the technological complexity of specific vaccine (Berndt, Glennerster et al., 2007). In 
                                                 
3 Light (2009:5):”Up to the final editing by an outside political writer, Kremer always called it and 
advanced purchase commitment (APC), or agreement, because it is not a “market” but a single large 
purchase.[…] Thus, until the final draft of the CGD report, it was called and APC, not an AMC, and one 
can find on Google extensive literature and references to APCs.”   21
2007, a pilot AMC was launched for a vaccine to be developed against pneumococcal 
viruses. It started with a $1.5 billion promise from five countries (Italy, the UK, Norway, 
Canada and Russia) and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation for a later stage of 
development of the vaccine, and a similar scheme was proposed for malaria
4. For Light 
(2009:ii) this arrangement is actually an advance procurement commitment as it pays for 
already developed vaccines. An AMC to treat malaria is expected to begin after 2016 and 
last for 11 years with a purchase commitment of US$2.3 billion.  
A number of objections have been raised against the CGD AMC Working Group 
report notably by one of its former members Donald Light already mentioned. Light 
(2005, 2009) is concerned that the IAC may lack transparency and independence from 
political pressures; he claims that the scheme neither guarantee a sustained market nor 
ensures sustainable growth of R&D arguing as well that R&D costs have not been 
estimated independently; and because patent rights are kept with the inventing companies 
access to new drugs may be reduced; he also worries that the AMC will damage the 
successful advancement made by PPPs and reduce pharmaceutical technology transfer to 
poor countries. Light (2005) stresses that stimulating R&D through a guaranteed 
purchase of a vaccine may be less efficient than directly financing R&D vaccine with the 
purchase money. He cites estimates of Finkelstein (2004: 543) for US vaccine trials that 
“for every $1 permanent increase in expected annual market revenue…, the 
pharmaceutical industry will spend an additional 6 cents annually in present discounted 
value on R&D”. Indeed, in a broader perspective, Cameron (1996) summarizes a number 
of empirical studies on output elasticity of R&D conducted from 1980 to 1995 for several 
high-tech industries and reports the elasticity to be in the range of 0.06 to 0.45 at firm 
                                                 
4 http://www.gavialliance.org/media_centre/press_releases/2010_03_23_amc_commitment.php    22
level. We estimated the elasticity of commercial R&D by cash flow at 0.36 for a dynamic 
panel of 482 pharmaceutical companies (available from the authors upon request).  
Farlow (2005) doubts that the setting of the AMC prize will be optimal due to the 
difficulty of estimating future costs and technological changes resulting in either a too 
low prize which may fail to motivate companies or in a too high prize wasting resources. 
Maurer (2006) argues that the AMC may overpay companies because no good quality 
drugs may be developed in a specific time period and also because actual R&D may cost 
20-30% less than the average targeted by the commitment. Moreover the cost-sharing 
mechanism implying co-payment by diseases affected countries might not be optimal. 
Cohen and Dupas (2010) have conducted an experiment in Kenya by distributing 
antimalarial insecticide-treated bed nets to pregnant women. They find no statistical 
evidence that cost-sharing affects nets usage; a dramatic demand reduction is however 
observed, they therefore argue that free distribution of the antimalarial nets might be 
more effective.  
Another objection to the scheme raised by both Light (2005) and Farlow (2005) 
and supported by more than fifty pharmaceutical companies is that only large 
pharmaceutical corporations may have enough cash to finance R&D. Senior executives of 
the companies pointed out that venture capitalists are looking for a significant return in 
the medium run and that it can take time for big pharmaceutical companies to find and 
subcontract to a small biotech company. Small biotech firms find it too expensive to 
finance phases II and III of clinical trials; small firms need assistance in dealing with 
health authorities in developing countries and some guarantees for purchases of final 
products (Grace, 2006: 11, 15). The fear is also that the majority of the AMC prize will   23
be spent on capital costs rather than on R&D; companies especially small ones may be 
facing additional capital costs due to uncertainty and risks (Farlow, 2005:16-19).  
This last set of issues affecting small companies matters given the role of small 
firms in developing new drugs. Villa, Compagni et al. (2009) calculated that the majority 
of new drugs approved under Orphan drug laws targeting diseases with small patient base 
have been developed and produced by small and medium sized pharmaceutical firms. 
Such drugs generate modest annual sales from US$50 to US$300 million and are less 
profitable than traditional blockbuster drugs. Love (2003: 10) cites the estimation of the 
Pharmaceutical Education and Research Institute for 117 drug development projects that 
it took just 7.1 years and $75.4 million in direct R&D costs per successful drug. This 
survey highlights that small firms spent less than half of the large firm costs per 
successful drug so that small firms tend to be more cost-efficient than larger one.  
Berndt and Hurvitz (2005) suggest that milestone payments can be made within 
the AMC scheme, but if there is an efficient market for R&D contracts such payments are 
not necessary as proper subcontracts can be negotiated. The problem however is that 
R&D markets are not efficient, especially in the short run. R&D markets suffer from 
asymmetric information and require search and information processing costs making the 
cost of external capital for an R&D project higher, this is especially true for small firms 
(Hall, 2002). Asymmetric information is endemic in part because R&D projects have a 
low probability of financial success (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). There are no 
financial standards to disclose and evaluate risks that relate to ongoing research meaning 
that new – and therefore financially constrained – biotech firms cannot straddle an 
optimal learning curve, as a few unsuccessful drug candidates result in the closing of the   24
small firm (Pisano, 2006). Asymmetric information is present between inventor and 
investor, as the inventor has more expertise in their own project or else hesitates to reveal 
all information; the situation is exacerbated by the high uncertainty of R&D projects that 
unevenly declines as a project progresses (Hall, 2002). Although many small firms in 
innovation-driven sectors may approach venture capitalists for finance, they may not be 
in position to do so as a drug project typically needs to generate a 25-35% annual return 
in order to attract investments from venture capitalists (Grabowski and Vernon, 2000). 
To address the issue of cash flow, Brogan and Mossialos (2006) propose selling a 
call option, i.e. a right to buy a future drug at a pre-specified price in case of its 
successful development. The general problem of application of financial instruments to 
NDs is that the market is unlikely to work in determining the prices of such instruments 
given the extremely limited number of potential buyers and sellers. The high uncertainty 
surrounding early stage R&D and insufficient observations on success rates and the 
quality of ND research projects make it quite challenging to value such options.  
 
3.3 Mixed schemes. 
An example of a mixed scheme using both push and pull factors is the Orphan (rare) 
drug scheme adopted by the USA, Japan, EU, and Australia. The push incentives include 
protocol assistance, fast-track approval, tax credits on clinical research, research grants, 
while the pull factors include extending patent rights with up to 7 years market 
exclusivity (Villa, Compagni et al. 2009). The US Orphan drug program has been rather 
successful, 326 drugs received FDA approval and 41 of these drugs were supported by   25
program grants; the vast majority of drug candidates were sourced from academia and 
biotechnology companies (Cote 2008).  
One criticism is that as Orphan drug incentives are effective only for drugs 
carrying very high prices affordable for health insurance systems in developed countries, 
no drug for neglected diseases was developed through this scheme (Trouiller, Olliaro et 
al., 2002). Moreover the risk is that with extended exclusivity periods, high prices for 
new drugs would reduce access and usage of such drugs in developing countries (Mrazek 
and Mossialos, 2003). This effect however could be compensated by granting orphan 
status to all NDs in the US and EU. This would bring additional incentives through high 
prices charged to developed countries consumers while charging more affordable prices 
to developing countries (Danzon, 2007). In addition, NDs seem to be spreading to rich 
countries, the US has more than 110,000 cases of dengue fever, over 3,000 cases of 
Chagas disease, and 8,000 schistosomiasis cases (Hotez, 2008). Many of these diseases 
are associated with US-Mexico border territories and African refugees. Malaria and 
human trypanosomiasis have already been given rare status (Villa, Compagni et al. 
2009).  
However, patients have differing nutrition, immunity, and cross-infection 
backgrounds according to whether they live in rich or poor countries and the difference 
may be such that drugs clinically tested on developed countries patients may not be 
effective for low-income countries patients. Another criticism of the scheme is that little 
competition seems to be encouraged facilitating first exclusive entry. For the period 
1983-2005 only one percent of drugs were allowed as the second entrant for the same 
condition in the Orphan scheme (Berndt, Glennerster et al. 2007).   26
Other mixed schemes include granting to a pharmaceutical company a voucher 
for FDA priority review of any drug in exchange for that company developing an 
approved drug to treat a ND (Ridley, Grabowski et al. 2006). This scheme has been 
implemented into US policy with the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 
(FDAAA) of 2007. FDA review is guaranteed within 6 months of submission; this 
voucher is transferable and can be sold (Cote 2008). The scheme assumes that the 
approved drugs must be superior to existing analogues and that patent rights for such 
drugs will be allocated in a public domain. Such a voucher might be valued at about $300 
million or more by a company with a potential blockbuster drug candidate and such 
voucher can be also auctioned to finance an R&D scheme. The assumption is that 
consumers in developed countries would benefit from accelerated approval of drugs 
without compromising safety as reducing review times by authorities does not increase 
drug market withdrawal (Berndt, Gottschalk et al. 2005); this scheme should not create 
congestion as firms will be paying a $1 million fee to the FDA for additional labour 
involved in the drug review. In short, the proceeds from selling one or two priority 
reviews together with the tax credits offered by the Orphan Drug Act should suffice to 
finance an ND drug (Ridley, Grabowski et al. 2006). Moran, Ropars et al. (2005) propose 
an auction of a right (options) for fast track priority reviews (fast track options – FTOs) 
of new commercial drugs by early involvement in monitoring and advising on clinical 
trials. FTOs allow greater flexibility in targeting the financing of R&D. 
Both of these schemes - the vouchers and FTOs – seem to be the most politically 
feasible way to raise funds as this does not imply explicit public expenditures. The risk 
however is that close substitutes known as me-too imitative drugs be pushed through   27
these schemes distorting incentives for creation of pioneering and therapeutically 
advanced commercial drugs. The share of me-too drugs is already quite high.  Only 14 
percent of all new chemical entities were therapeutically superior to existing drugs for the 
period 1997-2006 (Prescrire International, 2007). Philipson and Dai (2003: 46) argue that 
competition with newly patented drugs in the US reduces the first innovator sales more 
than generic drugs. Bartfai and Lees (2006: 41-42,197) state that if a good drug target is 
found, other companies enter the market with their drugs addressing the same target often 
within a year. Often drugs that enter the market second or third in a new therapeutic class 
are better than the first and acquire a larger slice of the market than the original 
innovator’s drug.  
With the voucher and FTO schemes firms may be tempted to minimize the costs 
of developing medicine for NDs through me-too drugs with insignificant therapeutic 
advantage over existing products or by not paying enough attention to the difficulty of 
drug delivery and administration in the field conditions of low income countries. This 
seems to be confirmed historically as out of 13 drugs for NDs developed by the 
pharmaceutical industry for 1975-1999, “12 had a low overall health value to developing 
country patients” (Grace 2006: 19). 
 
4. Designing the best scheme 
 
Using an R&D option model Hsu and Schwartz (2008) evaluated some research 
incentives for developing countries’ vaccines. Their criteria were expected R&D costs 
and price per treatment, probability of success, consumer surplus, expected vaccinations,   28
and expected cost per person successfully vaccinated. They concluded that (i) patent 
extension was not an effective incentive; (ii) fixed cost-sharing subsidy had a low 
expected cost to the sponsor, but generated lower consumer surplus if granted patents for 
new drugs increased prices; (iii) the AMC performed better than the cost-sharing subsidy; 
and (iv) a combination of an AMC and a cost-sharing subsidy may achieve the best 
results. However, the model did not take into account the conflict of interest between 
sponsors, consumers, and innovators, and assumed the quality of new vaccines to be 
impervious to the incentives in operation during the development process. Many schemes 
overcome participation constraint by implying some profitability to participating 
companies, but do not provide strong incentives to deliver quality drugs at the lowest 
cost. 
From our review in section 3 we selected seventeen criteria grouped into four 
categories: efficiency, feasibility, fairness, and sustainability. Our results are reported in 
Table 5. Five criteria appear in the sub-group relating to efficiency: rewards based on 
cost-efficiency and adoptability of new drugs, facilitation of competition in R&D and 
subsequent production of drugs, risks of distortions created by cross-subsidies, risks of 
inflated costs, facilitation of information disclosure. Four criteria appear in the sub-group 
relating to feasibility: requirement for special binding international agreements, scale of 
required direct public/charity funding, scale of public contributions from low income 
countries, complexity of administration. Three criteria appear in the sub-group relating to 
fairness: tackling the free rider problem, stockholders from affected countries as decision 
makers, restraining product prices in developing countries. Five criteria appear in the sub-
group relating to sustainability: long term self-financing, enabling public control over   29
project performance, capacity building of clinical experimentation in low income 
countries, adaptability to adverse grant and technology shocks through greater degree of 
freedom in scheme’s controls, incorporation of the full R&D cycle. 
 
Table 5 - Matrix of incentives for NDs 
Criteria  AMC  PPPs-   ODD   PVOD  GPF   PEEND 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Efficiency: 
rewards to efficiency  Possible  No  no  possible  possible   no 
Distortions  Low  Low  low  medium  low  very high 
Competition  Low  High  low  medium  possible  medium 
cost driven  No  Medium  no  no  medium  no 
information disclosure   Low  Medium  low  low  high  low 
Feasibility: 
binding international agreements  Yes  Optional  optional  optional  yes  yes 
direct public/charity funding  several bn 
US$ 
100 m US$  10 m US$  no  10 m US$  no 




No  no  no  possible  no 
complexities to administer   Medium  Medium  low  low  high  low 
Fairness: 
tackling international free-rider 
problem 
Yes  No  no  no  possible  no 
stockholders from affected 





no  no  possible  no 
restraining product prices in 
developing countries 
Yes  Somewhat  no  no  yes  no 
Sustainability 






yes  depends on 
donors 
Yes 
enabling public controls over 
project performance 
Medium  Medium  low  low  High  No 
capacity building of clinical 
experimentation in developing 
countries 
No  Medium  low  low  High priority 
is possible 
No 
Adaptability to adverse grant and 
technology shocks 
low   Low  medium  medium  low  medium 
Incorporation of the full R&D cycle  Yes  Somewhat  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Notes:  
* AMC: advanced market (purchase) commitment; PPPs: public-private partnerships; ODD: orphan drug 
designation; PVOD: the priority voucher and orphan designation; GPF: the global public funding; PEEND: 
patent extensions in exchange for NDs drugs. 
** the first four schemes are already implemented in practice.    30
 
Taking account of all aspects of the drug discovery process, we draw out seven 
characteristics which should feature in an optimal R&D scheme: 
1. Long term R&D financing to attract and keep human capital in the research. A 
regular program is needed to address drug resistant viruses and to create robust 
incentives. Maurer (2007:105) points out that repeat business enhances trust and 
reliability of incentives with inventors. Direct contributions from charities, international 
development organizations such as the World Bank and OECD governments and affected 
countries could fill the gap. The involvement of the World Bank would alleviate the 
problem of international free-rider whereby countries expect others to take the risks and 
of the incentives inconsistency pointed to by the authors of the AMC proposal. World 
Bank loans would allow access to cheap capital for drug development. This would give 
affected countries a voice, enhance cooperation and monitoring of the progress of related 
research projects, and ensure that R&D outcomes are tailored to developing countries’ 
needs. Hotez, Molyneux et al. (2006) emphasize that disease controls countries should 
themselves set appropriate policies and priorities and call for greater integration of 
international disease controls and specific disease programs. While direct contributions 
by affected countries will be small, G-20 countries could commit as much as 1% of their 
actual public pharmaceutical R&D to NDs research, especially on target selection and 
validation with the goal to facilitate the proof of concept studies. This 1% can generate at 
least a $200 million annual push incentive for upstream discovery of new drug 
candidates. With an average proof of concept studies costing $5-10 million, this could 
generate 20-40 drug candidates for clinical trials.    31
2. Public subsidies of clinical experimentation. Commercial companies spend 
more than 70% of their drug development budgets on failed compounds (Finkelstein 
2008: 66). Clinical trial subsidies could improve firms’ expected returns and, hence, the 
attractiveness of ND-related R&D. Jayadev and Stiglitz (2009) propose public funding of 
clinical trials and health value-added pricing in the pharmaceutical industry to increase 
genuine innovations and reduce R&D costs for new drugs. They emphasize the public 
nature of information coming from clinical trials, greater confidence in the quality of 
testing, avoidance of duplicative trials, and reducing entry barriers for small firms. This 
public funding complemented with open transparent and low cost tenders could partly 
solve the problem as clinical trials are a less innovative and less sophisticated stage of 
drug development than discovery of a drug candidate. Subsidies of clinical 
experimentation in developing countries can be productive as shown by FDA data on 
investigational new drugs (INDs): the shares of non-commercial INDs (mainly filed in 
submissions by practicing physicians) in total INDs ranged from 72.9% to 85.6% for the 
period 1982-2003 (PAREXEL: 185).  
3. The payoff to innovators should be based on the global cost-effectiveness of a 
new drug determined through clinical trials in several affected countries as suggested by 
Kremer and Glennerster (2004), Hollis (2006), and Pogge (2006). 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2007) foresees a cost-effectiveness analysis of new drugs 
becoming a requirement for all drug approval by 2020. Although cost-effectiveness 
analysis of medicines suffers from methodological difficulties (Drummond and Sculpher, 
2005), Drummond (2007) notes that ten countries were already using cost-benefit 
analysis for national drug reimbursement policies and such decision process is workable.   32
Setting prices for drug innovators and consumers in developing countries must be 
separated so as to provide both proper incentives for drug R&D and affordability of 
prices (Finkelstein, 2008). A detailed discussion of pricing for developing countries by 
Lanjouw and Jack (2003) concludes that generic manufacturers should be allowed to start 
production as soon as possible to supply affected countries with newly designed drugs for 
NDs.  
A clear compensation plan for companies would encourage R&D incentives, 
preferably using some simple formula with detailed calculation methodology to allow 
less discretion. For example, if age-adjusted global DALYs saved by a medication can be 
considered as an approximation to the marginal utility of a drug, a utility maximizing 
social planner should set ratio of drug prices to the ratio of their DALYs saved. Hence, a 
price offered to an innovator of a new drug through an APC scheme (APC PRICE) could 
be estimated as a fixed proportion of a current comparable drug price (CPRICE) for low 
income countries multiplied by the ratio of DALYs saved by the newly developed drug 
(DALYn) to DALYs saved by the current drug (DALYc): 
APC PRICE = K*DALYn/DALYc*CPRICE 
where K is some proportional coefficient set in advance through consultations with 
donors and pharmaceutical companies.  
Attaran and Granville (2004: 180-182) discuss methodological problems of 
traditional cost-effectiveness analysis such as DALY and years of life saved (YLS), 
including the variability of the value of a life saved and the underestimation of costs of a 
particular disease at the macroeconomic level in the long run. The reward would be 
justified if there is a robust procedure to estimate cost-benefit effects for a new drug in   33
field conditions. Sponsors could then pay for the net benefit of a drug based on clinical 
trials with existing drugs rather than with placebos. 
4. Insurance to pharmaceutical companies that some partial compensation will be 
made in case of research project failures provided that the project outcomes are promptly 
analyzed and published. Failures must also be properly analyzed as they are a source of 
important knowledge for other projects and, thus, are not socially wasteful.  
5. Transparency and accountability. In exchange for public subsidies, 
participating PPPs should promptly publish research project selection criteria, budgeting, 
research outcomes, and governance. Finkelstein (2008: 120) notes that pharmaceutical 
companies have a “financial incentive to hide unfavourable study results form investors 
and the public”. A good scheme must encourage the public provision of all scientific 
information and related materials. 
6. Network based research. PPPs network allows a high level of competition. 
Pharmaceutical companies increasingly follow more open innovation by outsourcing 
R&D, creating joint ventures, licensing research and working within large research 
networks. In 1999, a quarter of R&D spending was contracted via outsourcing contracts 
to clinical research organizations (CROs) (Gassmann et al, 2008). Outsourcing is widely 
used in the production of pharmaceuticals and is also increasingly utilized in drug 
development: more than 40% of all pharmaceutical R&D activities were outsourced in 
2004 (Kalorama Information cited by Schwitzer (2006: 68)). For example the virtual drug 
development company Protodigm established by Roche managed the development of 
several drugs with 10 employees by choosing the most qualified subcontractor for each 
R&D stage, including pre-clinical and clinical trials, production, drug registration and   34
marketing (Gassmann et al, 2008). Global virtual networks could be extended by 
including “sharing drug-discovery tools, matching potential collaborators, databases, and 
with a common platform for management of intellectual property and administration” 
(Callan and Gillespie, 2007: 165). Virtual brokered drug-discovery networks might 
attract a wide range of contributors and provide access to industrial laboratories 
(Hopkins, Witty et al. 2007).  
Proper incentives for each R&D stage of the project management cycle can be 
designed. Target identification is essentially an academic problem where university and 
public research institutions specialists can be involved. At this stage, open calls for 
potential drug targets, and relatively small research grants for the academic community 
might have the highest impact. Identification of drug candidates and their synthesis for 
the specified targets can be outsourced through procurement tenders. Preclinical tests of 
drug candidates for tropical infectious diseases can serve as a good proxy for success in 
clinical trials, preclinical trials costs are around $20 million for a drug candidate 
(Hopkins, Witty et al. 2007). Clinical trials can be conducted with the help of specialist 
business CROs in partnership with hospitals in developing countries. There should be 
both training programs and tenders for clinical trials in affected countries. This could 
reduce the costs, create additional capacities for clinical studies and optimize drug usage.  
7. Innovators coordination. Drug R&D research has economies of scale and scope 
in maintaining a diverse compound portfolio and in capturing knowledge spillovers 
between projects (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996) suggesting that coordination and 
portfolio management of PPPs will be beneficial. Moran, Ropars et al. (2005) propose the 
creation of an Industry Research Facilitation Fund (IRFF) providing R&D grants for NDs   35
to the industry and academia through PPPs to a total amount of about US$250 million per 
year. This Fund could draw up and execute long term plans of drug development, accredit 
PPPs, manage global drug portfolios, provide management support, conduct negotiations 
with the industry and governments, give technical advice, provide legal support, act as an 
information hub for all stakeholders, and provide other shared services to PPPs to avoid 
redundancy across the partnerships. Such a coordination platform could be helpful as 
many services are common across all PPP projects and represent fixed costs. Performing 
such services through one hub could reduce fixed costs per project and, thus, contribute 
to lower R&D costs. Coordinated portfolio management could reduce the risks of failure 
through the pooling of drug candidates and also enable the purchase a cheaper collective 
insurance for possible product liabilities. The Fund could support a technology trust to 
pool patents related to NDs as advocated by So (2008). The platform could also negotiate 
access to medical expertise and drug discovery tools, including chemical libraries at big 
pharmaceutical companies, and provide advice on national academic grants for 




In this paper, schemes for R&D on NDs have been summarized; a matrix evaluates these 
schemes according to seventeen criteria grouped into four categories: efficiency, 
feasibility, fairness, and sustainability with the conclusion that the best existing scheme 
for NDs is likely to be the proposal of Moran, Ropars et al. (2005) with subsidies and 
grants channelled through a centralized PPP platform. The public intervention should   36
target barriers in the way of a successful innovation process with a view to reducing its 
risks and costs, enhancing competition, and promoting the communication of ideas and 
all results. The nature of the drug discovery process requires (i) long term R&D 
financing, with G20 countries allocating to NDs a 1% share of their current spending on 
public pharmaceutical R&D, (ii) public subsidies for clinical experimentation, (iii) basing 
the payoff to innovators on the global cost-effectiveness of a new drug, (iv) R&D project 
insurance, (v) transparency and accountability in exchange for public funds, (vi) network 
based research to allow greater competition among many parallel experiments, (vii) 
coordination for innovators through a common service platform.  
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